A Fascinating Analysis Based on Newly Declassified Documents from the Former USSR and Communist Bloc

In the spring and summer of 1956 the Soviet Union invaded Hungary to reassert strict communist rule. Patterns of Misperception: International Decision Making in the 1956 Hungarian Crisis is the first analytical monograph in English drawing on new archival collections from East bloc countries to reinterpret decision making during this Cold War crisis. Johanna Granville selects four key patterns of misperception as laid out by Columbia University political scientist Robert Jervis and shows how these patterns prevailed in the military crackdown and in other countries' reactions to it.

Granville perceptively examines the statements and actions of Soviet Presidium members, the Hungarian leadership, U.S. policy makers, and even Yugoslav and Polish leaders. According to Granville, Soviet first secretary Nikita Khrushchev zigzagged ineptly between policy options with apparently little or no analysis of costs and risks, permitting Moscow’s Eastern European satellites at times to subtly manipulate the Kremlin's decision making. Granville’s discussions of Polish policy, Yugoslav actions, and the arduous process of normalization after the uprising show that the Soviets were preoccupied with stemming what many of them construed as a Western-encouraged attempt to undermine Eastern Europe’s communist regimes.

Granville concludes that the United States bears some responsibility for the events of 1956, as ill-advised U.S. covert actions may have convinced the Soviet leaders that the United States was attempting to weaken Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, although the Eisenhower administration actually intended only to sow confusion and dissatisfaction.

This masterful study leads to the conclusion that the Hungarian Crisis in 1956 was most likely sustained by self-perpetuating misperceptions and suspicions among key countries. In short, Granville's multi-archival research tends to confirm the post-revisionists' theory about the cold war: it was everyone's fault and no one's fault. It resulted from the emerging bipolar structure of the international system, the power vacuum in Europe's center, and spiraling misconceptions.

JOHANNA GRANVILLE is a recent resident scholar at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, as well as at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C. A recipient of Fulbright, IREX, Kennan Institute, and ACTR grants, she spent many years conducting archival research in Moscow, Budapest, and Warsaw. She served as visiting civilian professor at the United States Air War College, assistant professor at Carnegie Mellon University, and teaching fellow at Harvard University. She is a graduate of Amherst College and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University).

“. . . a fascinating study, meticulously documented, that not only sheds new light on an agonizing incident in the Cold War, but shows how it fits with theories of decision-making. Using archives from several countries, Granville demonstrates that leaders woefully misunderstood each other, had very different perspectives, and failed to realize that their views were not shared.”--—Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics, Columbia University; President, American Political Science Association; and author, Perception and Misperception in International Politics

“. . . Granville has combined new information with thoughtful analysis to enrich our understanding of one important event in Cold War history, and thus contributes to a better understanding of the broader canvas of that history as well.” --Raymond L. Garthoff, former CIA Analyst; Ambassador to Bulgaria; Senior Analy

“. . . With her extensive scholarly examination of the Soviet intervention in Hungary, Johanna Granville makes a wonderful contribution to the new field of international --Vladislav Zubok, Temple University, and author, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold